07 Geopolitics of the United States. Geopolítica dos Estados Unidos


Contents: 01, 02, 03,


The new trade policy of the United States, initiated by the  Presidential Memorandum on the Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation, on China trade practices,  issued on March 22, 2018 by President Trump represents a turning-point in  the geopolitical standing, that the United States kept during the whole second half of the twentieth century. The refusal of the US in adhering to  the Transpacific Trade Treaty, that would have  transformed the whole Pacific Ocean area in a free trade space, inside which the US naturally  would be the main commercial target of all the participants countries, was a clever and prudent initial step of this  new geopolitical standing of the United States. Cf. 02, below. Cf. China's acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation.


"Sir Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics, and Policymaking in the 21st Century"

Quotes from Fettweis'  article,  that is a discussion and critical analysis of  Sir Halford Mackinder's Geopolitics.

"Few modern ideologies are as whimsically all-encompassing, as romantically obscure, as intellectually sloppy, and as likely to start a third world war as the theory of `geopolitics.  --Charles Clover, 1999"

"A Brief History of Geopolitics in Theory and Policy"  by Christopher J. Fettweis.

To the early 20th-century British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder, world history was a story of constant conflict between land and sea powers. In the past, during what he described as the Columbian Epoch, increased mobility that the sea provided put naval powers at a distinct advantage over their territorial adversaries. The classic example of this advantage was the Crimean War, in which Russia could not project power to the south as effectively as the sea-supplied French and British, despite the fact that the battlefields were far closer to Moscow than to London. But the Columbian Epoch was coming to a conclusion at the turn of the 20th century when Mackinder was first writing, as evolving technology, especially the system of railroads, allowed land powers to be nearly as mobile as those of the sea. Because land powers on the World Island had a smaller distance to travel than the sea powers operating on its periphery, any increase in their mobility would tip the balance of power in their favor. These "interior lines" gave the power with the "central position" on the World Island the ability to project power anywhere more rapidly than the sea powers could defend. Thus, who ruled the Heartland would have the possibility of commanding the entire World Island.

Mackinder believed that the world had evolved into what he called a "closed system." There was no more room for expansion by the end of the 19th century, for colonialism had brought the entire world under the sway of Europe. Power politics of the future, Mackinder speculated, would be marked by a competition over the old territories rather than a quest for new ones. His Heartland concept recalled the 18th-century strategists' notion of the "key position" on the battlefield,[7] the recognition of which was crucial to victory. Traditional military strategists thought that control of the key position on the map was crucial to winning the war, and since Mackinder recognized that the round world was now one big battlefield, identification and control of the key position would lead to global supremacy.

Mackinder's theories might have faded into irrelevance were it not for their apparent influence on the foreign policy of Nazi Germany. A German geopolitician and devotee of Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, spent the interwar period writing extensively about the Heartland and the need for Lebensraum (additional territory deemed essential for continued national well-being) for the German people. End of Quote.


The Monroe Doctrine was declared in a few paragraphs of President James Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823. Monroe warned European countries not to interfere in the Western Hemisphere, stating "that the American continents. . .are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." The Monroe Doctrine became a cornerstone of future U.S. foreign policy.

(December 2, 1823). Cornerstone of U.S foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine was enunciated by President James Monroe in his annual message to Congress. Declaring that the Old World and New World had different systems and must remain distinct spheres, Monroe made four basic points: (1) The United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of or the wars between European powers; (2) the United States recognized and would not interfere with existing colonies and dependencies in the Western Hemisphere; (3) the Western Hemisphere was closed to future colonization; and (4) any attempt by a European power to oppress or control any nation in the Western Hemisphere would be viewed as a hostile act against the United States.

The doctrine was an outgrowth of concern in both England and the United States that the continental powers would attempt to restore Spain's former colonies, in Latin America, many of which had become newly independent nations. The United States was also concerned about Russia's territorial ambitions in the northwest coast of North America. As a consequence, George Canning, the British foreign minister, suggested a joint U.S.-British declaration forbidding future colonization in Latin America. Monroe was initially favourable to the idea, and former presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison concurred. But Secretary of State John Quincy Adams argued that the United States should issue a statement of American policy exclusively, and his view ultimately prevailed.

The Monroe Doctrine, in asserting unilateral U.S. protection over the entire Western Hemisphere, was a foreign policy that could not have been sustained militarily in 1823. Monroe and Adams were well aware of the need for the British fleet to deter potential aggressors in Latin America. Because the United States was not a major power at the time and because the continental powers apparently had no serious intentions of recolonizing Latin America, Monroe's policy statement (it was not known as the "Monroe Doctrine" for nearly 30 years) was largely ignored outside the United States.

The United States did not invoke it nor oppose British occupation of the Falkland Islands in 1833 or subsequent British encroachments in Latin America. In 1845 and again in 1848, however, President James K. Polk reiterated Monroe's principles in warning Britain and Spain not to establish footholds in Oregon, California, or Mexico's Yucatan peninsula. At the conclusion of the Civil War, the United States massed troops on the Rio Grande in support of a demand that France withdraw its puppet kingdom from Mexico. In 1867—in part due to U.S. pressure—France withdrew.

After 1870 interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine became increasingly broad. As the United States emerged as a world power, the Monroe Doctrine came to define a recognized sphere of influence. President Theodore Roosevelt added the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904; it stated that, in cases of flagrant and chronic wrongdoing by a Latin American nation, the United States could intervene in the internal affairs of that nation. Roosevelt's assertion of hemispheric police power was designed to preclude violation of the Monroe Doctrine by European countries seeking redress of grievances against unruly or mismanaged Latin American states.
From the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt to that of Franklin Roosevelt, the United States frequently intervened in Latin America, especially in the Caribbean. Since the 1930s, the United States has attempted to formulate its Latin American foreign policy in consultation with the individual nations of the hemisphere and with the Organization of American States. Yet the United States continues to exercise a proprietary role at times of apparent threat to its national security, and the Western Hemisphere remains a predominantly U.S. sphere of influence. (Encyclopaedia Britannica Article)


The Monroe Doctrine was expressed during President Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress, December 2, 1823:

. . . At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . .

It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the results have been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgement of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none of them more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different.

It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in hope that other powers will pursue the same course. . . .


“To take care of our own is the number one American obligation. The destiny of America, certainly is not either to reform or to police the world.”  Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota




Presidential Memorandum on the Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation. FOREIGN POLICY  Issued on: March 22, 2018








SUBJECT:        Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation of China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation

On August 14, 2017, I directed the United States Trade Representative (Trade Representative) to determine whether to investigate China’s laws, policies, practices, or actions that may be unreasonable or discriminatory and that may be harming American intellectual property rights, innovation, or technology development.  On August 18, 2017, the Trade Representative initiated an investigation under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (the “Act”) (19 U.S.C. 2411).

During its investigation, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) consulted with appropriate advisory committees and the interagency section 301 Committee.  The Trade Representative also requested consultations with the Government of China, under section 303 of the Act (19 U.S.C. 2413).  The USTR held a public hearing on October 10, 2017, and two rounds of public written comment periods.  The USTR received approximately 70 written submissions from academics, think tanks, law firms, trade associations, and companies.

The Trade Representative has advised me that the investigation supports the following findings:

First, China uses foreign ownership restrictions, including joint venture requirements, equity limitations, and other investment restrictions, to require or pressure technology transfer from U.S. companies to Chinese entities.  China also uses administrative review and licensing procedures to require or pressure technology transfer, which, inter alia, undermines the value of U.S. investments and technology and weakens the global competitiveness of U.S. firms.

Second, China imposes substantial restrictions on, and intervenes in, U.S. firms’ investments and activities, including through restrictions on technology licensing terms.  These restrictions deprive U.S. technology owners of the ability to bargain and set market-based terms for technology transfer.  As a result, U.S. companies seeking to license technologies must do so on terms that unfairly favor Chinese recipients.

Third, China directs and facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition of, U.S. companies and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property and to generate large-scale technology transfer in industries deemed important by Chinese government industrial plans.

Fourth, China conducts and supports unauthorized intrusions into, and theft from, the computer networks of U.S. companies.  These actions provide the Chinese government with unauthorized access to intellectual property, trade secrets, or confidential business information, including technical data, negotiating positions, and sensitive and proprietary internal business communications, and they also support China’s strategic development goals, including its science and technology advancement, military modernization, and economic development.

It is hereby directed as follows:

Section 1.  Tariffs.  (a)  The Trade Representative should take all appropriate action under section 301 of the Act (19 U.S.C. 2411) to address the acts, policies, and practices of China that are unreasonable or discriminatory and that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.  The Trade Representative shall consider whether such action should include increased tariffs on goods from China.

(b)  To advance the purposes of subsection (a) of this section, the Trade Representative shall publish a proposed list of products and any intended tariff increases within 15 days of the date of this memorandum.  After a period of notice and comment in accordance with section 304(b) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 2414(b)), and after consultation with appropriate agencies and committees, the Trade Representative shall, as appropriate and consistent with law, publish a final list of products and tariff increases, if any, and implement any such tariffs.

Sec. 2.  WTO Dispute Settlement.  (a)  The Trade Representative shall, as appropriate and consistent with law, pursue dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to address China’s discriminatory licensing practices.  Where appropriate and consistent with law, the Trade Representative should pursue this action in cooperation with other WTO members to address China’s unfair trade practices.

(b)  Within 60 days of the date of this memorandum, the Trade Representative shall report to me his progress under subsection (a) of this section.

Sec. 3.  Investment Restrictions.  (a)  The Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary), in consultation with other senior executive branch officials the Secretary deems appropriate, shall propose executive branch action, as appropriate and consistent with law, and using any available statutory authority, to address concerns about investment in the United States directed or facilitated by China in industries or technologies deemed important to the United States.

(b)  Within 60 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary shall report to me his progress under subsection (a) of this section.

Sec. 4.  Publication.  The Trade Representative is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.


The White House

CONGRATULATIONS MR. PRESIDENT: The right  measures the US is about to take, concerning the correction of its strongly misguided post-war foreign and commercial  policies, that led to the present distresses of the American people, will have not only an immediate impact on the US trade and on American social behaviour, but also points out, for the first time, to a sure direction towards more considerate  and proper economic policies, for the whole world. Besides taking these measures, that the Administration is well advised to take now, it is utterly necessary to develop a wider system of public information about the economic soundness and rationale of the new measures, that aim simply at the reconstructing the US economic might, self-sufficiency,  and guarantee of full employment for the American work force, in short, policies and measures for the US  social and national security, in the long run. Unfortunately, in the absence of a proper information system about the real problems and situation of the American people, a kind of Voice of America, or America as it is for poor Americans, the image of the present American Administration is being outlined by distorted deliberate misinformation, relentlessly broadcasted and written by the American media and reproduced ipsis litteris by the world information system. I hope the next Economic Repport of the President be a kind of Keynesian lecture on  How to make an once great nation great again. Prof. Dr. Darcy Carvalho. University of São Paulo. Department of Economics. Fellow in 1991-92 of the Columbia University Center for the Japanese Economy and  Associate Professor of the University of California at Berkeley. March 23rd, 2018. darcy@usp.br or darcy@darcycarvalho.com.br  


The purpose of this American official document is to register public testimony relating to whether acts, policies, and practices of the Government of China relating to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. It is reproduced in full below as China Technology Transfer Hearing Transcript. Cf. also the site


04 Findings of the investigation into China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation under section 301 of the trade act of 1974.

CORE ELEMENTS OF SECTION 301. The investigation on CHINA'S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION has been brought under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (the Trade Act).1 

"Section 301 is a key enforcement tool that may be used to address a wide variety of unfair acts, policies, and practices of U.S. trading partners. Section 301 sets out three categories of acts, policies, or practices of a foreign country that are potentially actionable: (i) trade agreement violations; (ii) acts, policies or practices that are unjustifiable (defined as those that are inconsistent with U.S. international legal rights) and that burden or restrict U.S. Commerce; and (iii) acts, policies or practices that are unreasonable or discriminatory and that burden or restrict U.S. Commerce. 2 The third category of conduct is most relevant to this investigation. Section 301 defines “discriminatory” to “include, when appropriate, any act, policy, and practice which denies national or most-favored nation treatment to United States goods, service, or investment.”3 An “unreasonable” act, policy, or practice is one that “while not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United States is otherwise unfair and inequitable.”4 The statute further provides that in determining if a foreign country’s practices are unreasonable, reciprocal opportunities to those denied U.S. firms “shall be taken into account, to the extent appropriate.  After the testimony from each panel of 9 witnesses, agency representatives will have an opportunity to ask questions. All questions will be from agency representatives. There will be no questions accepted from the floor. All public submissions for this hearing are available for public review on the regulations.gov website. The docket number is 16 USTR-2017-0016. 17. Post-hearing comments, including any written responses to questions from the Section 301 Committee, are due by Friday, October 20, 2017. The rules and procedures for written submissions are available in the original Federal Register Notice. 22 ( End of quotation)

Darcy Carvalho,
1 de mai. de 2016 18:05
Darcy Carvalho,
1 de mai. de 2016 11:28
Darcy Carvalho,
1 de mai. de 2016 11:18
Darcy Carvalho,
23 de mar. de 2018 08:47
Darcy Carvalho,
7 de ago. de 2014 15:10
Darcy Carvalho,
1 de mai. de 2016 10:59
Darcy Carvalho,
23 de mar. de 2018 06:44
Darcy Carvalho,
1 de mai. de 2016 14:10
Darcy Carvalho,
4 de mai. de 2020 15:34
Darcy Carvalho,
18 de mar. de 2019 13:13